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Beheading the Hydra: Combating
Political Corruption and Organised
Crime
Christian Göbel
1 Taking  Robert  Dahl’s  well-known  concept  of  a  liberal  democracy  as  a  benchmark,
Taiwan  can  be  said  to  have  completed  its  democratic  transition  with  the  direct
elections for the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan in 1991 and 19921. Since
then,  its  democratic  consolidation has  made remarkable  progress,  especially  in  the
realm of institution building and the emergence of a vibrant civil society. It is safe to
say that authoritarianism is a thing of the past and that all relevant parties, politicians
and  the  general  public  are  committed  to  Taiwan’s  democratic  system.  However,
political  scandals,  frequent brawls  in the Legislative Yuan and the inability  to  pass
important reform bills have made clear that although Taiwan’s democracy is resilient,
there is  still  much room for improvement or “democratic  deepening”.  A consistent
feature throughout Taiwan’s political transformation has been the worrying influence
of  local-level  clientelist  networks,  moneyed  interests  and  even  organised  crime  on
Taiwan’s politics. 
2 The roots of these ills stem from the kind of democratisation Taiwan has experienced
and the character  of  its  former autocratic  political  system. From 1911 to  1992,  the
Republic of China was an authoritarian regime ruled by one party, which dominated
the  state  and  penetrated  deep  into  economy  and  society.  Compared  to  other
authoritarian regimes, Taiwan’s autocracy proved to be remarkably stable. This was not
due to excessive coercion, but resulted from an intricate arrangement of incentives and
dependencies  which  bound  major  societal  forces  to  the  leading  Nationalist  Party
(Kuomintang, KMT).
3 As Chen Tung-sheng2, Chen Ming-tong 3 and others have shown, the KMT (or at least its
politically domineering factions4) held on to these structures, so democratisation did
not obliterate,  it  merely altered them. With the KMT bereft  of  autocratic  means to
control its agents, powerful (collective) actors like local clientelistic networks and large
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enterprises  grew  in  significance,  and  the  relationship  between  them  and  the  KMT
turned the former patron-agent relationship into one of mutual dependence. This led
to the emergence of “black gold” (heijin), the collusion between politicians on the one
side and organised crime and big business on the other. Both helped the KMT to stay in
power, but not without demanding something in return.
4 As factions within the KMT had realised very early, these exchanges were bound to
drain the reservoir of legitimacy the party had built up by steering Taiwan’s “economic
miracle”.  Since its  foundation in 1986 and with increased intensity before the 1992
Legislative Yuan elections,  the oppositional Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) had
made the fight against political corruption and organised crime a major campaign issue
and had thereby pushed the KMT further into a dilemma: it had to fight corruption,
organised crime and rid itself of its reliance on localist networks, while at the same
time depending on these very groups for its survival. 
5 The DPP’s  situation,  of  course,  was quite  different.  The DPP had a  vital  interest  in
fundamentally changing the political rules of the game, which were tailor-made for the
KMT and first barred the DPP from taking power and later from fully implementing its
political  agenda.  Put  simply,  the  KMT’s  anti-“black  gold“  policies  were  aimed  at
increasing its  legitimacy without changing the informal rules of  the political  game,
while  the  DPP  strove  to  create  a  different  political  environment  which  was  more
conducive to its survival. 
6 In  line with these observations,  this  article  combines two perspectives  to  highlight
continuity  and  change  between  each  administration’s  fight  against  corruption,
organised crime and vote buying. The first looks at policy, examining the formulation,
implementation  and  impact  of  the  most  relevant  measures  taken  by  each
administration. The other,  an institutionalist  perspective,  explains how institutional
constraints limited the relevant actors’ scope of action, resulting in outcomes often not
matching the original intentions. 
7 This  article  consists  of  three  parts.  The  first  briefly  sketches  the  institutional
foundations of the KMT’s one-party rule and the impact of democratisation on it. The
second elucidates the dilemma the KMT has faced when forced to fight the very groups
it depended on for political survival. It describes the KMT’s anti-“black gold” policies
and offers explanations for their superficiality, selectivity and lack of impact. The third
part depicts the various anti-“black gold” measures envisioned by the Chen Shui-bian
administration and examines their implementation. 
One-party rule and the emergence of “black gold” 
8 A close look at the institutional foundations of the KMT’s five-decade-long one-party
rule  tells  us  much about  the  difficulties  the  opposition  has  faced  in  altering  these
structures.  As  they  were  all-encompassing,  linking  the  state  apparatus,  society,  big
business  and most  relevant  political  actors  to  the KMT,  but  not  to  each other,  the
Taiwanese political scientist Hu Fu has aptly invoked the metaphor of an “umbrella-”
structure of authoritarianism5. As was the case in most of the stable South-East Asian
authoritarian regimes, the legitimacy of the KMT one-party state hinged on its ability
to deliver monetary rents to various constituencies, to play important actors off against
each  other  without  alienating  them  from  the  regime,  and  to  prevent  splits  in  its
leadership6. 
9 In retrospect, the KMT was able to accomplish two difficult feats: to rule by distributing
financial  favours  without  driving  itself  into  bankruptcy,  and  to  keep  a  potentially
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hostile 80%-majority of the population loyal to the “alien” regime. As for the first feat,
the  KMT  led  the  economic  bureaucracy  in  implementing  a  model  of  state-led
modernisation while at the same time keeping tight control over the financial sector,
landed property and Taiwan’s major industrial conglomerates. Its monopoly on vital
resources and its power over Taiwan’s economy allowed it to channel money without
squandering  it.  The  KMT  made  sure  that  the  enterprises  that  benefited  from  its
patronage stayed competitive by selectively lowering trade barriers, thereby exposing
them to the world market. Also, the government passed and enforced strict laws that
prohibited government officials from collusion with the financial sector7.
10 In  addition  to  this  “political”  control  of  the  business  sector,  the  KMT  exerted
“economic” control by being a powerful economic actor itself. As there was no effective
separation between party and state and especially between party property and state
coffers, the KMT had a tremendous financial leverage it could use to attain its economic
goals.  It  used its  monopoly on vital  inputs such as steel,  petrochemicals  and heavy
machinery to build up “an array of satellite suppliers and subservient down-stream
firms”8 that  competed  for  contracts  with  public  enterprises.  Because  they  were
exchangeable,  they  were  discouraged  from  forming  alliances  that  might  have
challenged KMT supremacy. In addition, a hierarchical system of industrial associations
with compulsory membership gave the KMT further control over important business
leaders. Naturally, some of the small-and-medium sized enterprises in the countryside
escaped this kind of control, but their access to land and capital was severely restricted.
This made sure that they did not expand unduly.
11 How did the KMT produce regime legitimacy despite widespread hostility by the native
people?  Again,  the  skilful  handling  of  monetary  resources  coupled  with  balancing
mechanisms, most notably local elections, provides much of the answer. 
12 In the organisation of Taiwan’s local policy, local factions (difang paixi) are local-level
clientelistic networks. Most of Taiwan's counties (xian) and municipalities have two,
some three  local  factions,  which compete  for  local  economic  and power  resources.
Factions usually are held together by ties of blood, kinship and marriage, but also by
interpersonal relationships9. The KMT made use of local factions basically by trading
money for support via local-level elections. Getting elected at the local level was not
very attractive in terms of political power, because local government was in the firm
grip of the party state. Political office, however, granted access to local monopoly and
oligopoly rights and "money machines" like the credit departments of the fishermen’s
associations (yuhui),  the water conservancy associations (shuilihui),  and the farmer's
associations (nonghui)10. In addition, political protection of semi-legal or illegal projects
such as brothels, gambling dens and karaoke bars guaranteed the local power-holders
further resources. 
13 The  organisational  capacity  of  the  KMT,  a  tailor-made  electoral  system  and  its
clientelistic  relationship to the local  factions made influence on electoral  outcomes
highly effective during authoritarianism. All that was required was the subdivision of
an electoral district into as many parts as there were candidates, and ensure that each
candidate received just the right number of votes 11. This was achieved with the help of
vote-brokers (zhuangjiao)12. In order to be successful in these elections, one usually had
to be nominated by the KMT, who had the organisational means to coordinate votes
and candidates, the financial means to co-finance the costly electoral campaigns, and
the  coercive  means  to  deter  non-authorised  candidates  from  running.  As  a
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consequence, candidates of the various local factions competed for nomination by the
KMT,  and  local  alliances  against  the  KMT  were  highly  unlikely  unless  the  KMT
disregarded  the  factions  by  filing  its  own  candidates.  This  was  backed  up  by  the
rigorous enforcement of a policy that forbade factions to conclude alliances beyond the
county level13. 
14 To summarise, the native population was mobilised by local politico-economic groups,
which in turn received resources by the KMT. They were balanced against each other
by means of local elections, in which they had to run as KMT-candidates. At the same
time, these elections produced legitimacy for the regime, because they were reasonably
competitive, and the KMT always won. 
Democratisation and the increasing importance of “black gold”
15 In the course of Taiwan's democratic transition, the KMT's relationship to both major
economic actors and local factions underwent massive changes. Economic and political
liberalisation  strengthened  the  hand  of  both  the  local  factions  and  the  business
community, as they could now expand and form alliances. This turned the clientelistic
relationship  between  them  and  the  KMT  (most  of  all  its  Lee  Teng-hui-  dominated
“mainstream faction”,  zhuliupai)  into  an interdependent  one.  Taiwan’s  “umbrella  of
authoritarianism” thus turned into a web of mutual dependencies.
16 In  order  to  secure  the  business  community’s  compliance,  the  KMT introduced new
land-based economic rents such as construction projects and real-estate development,
which became quickly linked to the blossoming financial sector. Meanwhile, a host of
private  enterprises  that  were  held  in  an  economic  stranglehold  during  the
authoritarian regime began to prosper. The lack of formal rules governing business
behaviour on the one hand and political  candidates’  need for funding on the other
made  for  strategic  relationships  between  actors  of  the  business  community  and
politicians at all levels. With increased importance of the representative organs after
democratisation, the number of candidates rose, as did campaign costs. This created
incentives for business groups to sponsor candidates and in return receive political
influence. Often businessmen sought political office themselves.
17 Local factions also became diversified both in their structure and in their sources of
income. They could now form alliances. Land and real estate development became the
main sources of rent-seeking. Many local factions started to become allied with the new
financial  groups,  which had begun to  mushroom since the 1980s,  leading to  a  new
typology of interest-based associations ranging from the “traditional” local faction to
the nationwide financial  group14.  With elections for  the central-level  representative
organs conducted,  the door to central  government was opened,  and the Legislative
Yuan became a  major  playing field  for  these  associations.  Their  percentage  among
representatives  increased  as  steadily  as  did  corrupt  practices  in  the  representative
organs15. Furthermore, political alliances with local factions were no longer limited to
the KMT. The DPP’s successful electoral performance in the 1997 county-level election
had brought it into contact with local factions as well. This further strengthened them,
because now they could play the parties and even factions within a party off against
each other.  However,  as  the DPP party  centre  did not  have the financial  means to
sustain the factions in the way the KMT could, its contact with them took a different
shape.  DPP  heavyweights  supported  local  politicians  by  the  promise  of  public
construction projects or by visiting them in their home districts, thus boosting their
image16. 
Beheading the Hydra: Combating Political Corruption and Organised Crime
China Perspectives, 56 | november - december 2004
4
18 Of course, DPP politicians were not free of the trappings of money and power. Some of
them became involved in shady deals as well, and a number of the DPP’s elected local
deputies have been believed to be connected to the underworld17. “Some of the DPP’s
strongest vote-getters belonged to local factions; being affiliated with the opposition
did not stop candidates from corralling tiao-a-ka (vote brokers), distributing patronage
and buying votes”18. Equally, vote-buying in the DPP’s primary elections has become an
embarrassment for the party19. However, corruption and vote-buying in the DPP are by
no means as systematic as in the KMT, and it is safe to say that they are not condoned
by the party central. 
 
1. Legal Revision proposed as part of the Ministry of Justice’s “Action Programme to Sweep Out
Black Gold"
Sources: Republic of China, Ministry of Justice, Fawubu saochu heijin xingdong fang’an zhi jinxing
qingxing ji xuxiao baogaobiao (Report Table of State of Implementation and Effects of the Ministry of
JusticeÕs Action Programme to Sweep Out Black Gold), <http://www.moj.gov.tw/chinese/
d3_5_detail.aspx? jobtype=14&jobid=1300000002>, 2000, accessed March 2004; Republic of China,
Ministry of Justice, Saochu heijin xingdong fangan houxu tuidong fang’an (Follow-up Programme to
the Action Programme to Sweep Out Black Gold), <http://www.moj.gov.tw/chinese/d3_5_detail.aspx?
jobtype=14&jobid=1300000002>, 2002, accessed March 2004; legal drafts.
19 This environment also paved the way for organised crime into the Legislative Yuan and
local politics. First, the increase of crackdowns on vote-buying introduced crime groups
as mediators because the high sentences for vote-buying deterred many traditional
vote-brokers20.  Such elements also acted as bodyguards or thugs who intimidated or
blackmailed opposition candidates for payment and political  protection21.  Evidently,
once a local faction employed gangsters to combat political opponents by illegal means,
the opposition faction was forced to follow suit. Second, gangsters who had made a
fortune by dabbling in construction projects or illegal ventures became particularly
vulnerable to extortion from their protectors in the political realm and to crackdowns
against  organised  crime.  In  order  to  protect  themselves,  many  gangsters  ran  for
political office to gain immunity. In this way, gang leaders became conveners of the
Police  Administration  Group  (jingzheng  xiaozu) in  the  local  legislatures  where  they
supervised  the  local  police  departments22.  In  the  Legislative  Yuan,  legislators
implicated in legal suits often sought a seat in the Judiciary Committee. Lo Fu-chu, the
alleged leader of the Tiandaomeng (Heaven and Earth Society), one of the biggest crime
syndicates in Taiwan, even served as one of the committee's three conveners23.  The
Shangye zhoubao (Business Weekly) in 1999 reported that legislators with an organised
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crime background exerted considerable influence in the Legislative Yuan by means of
threats and terror against individual lawmakers, some of them even accompanied by
gunmen disguised as assistants24. 
The clean-up efforts during the KMT era 
20 Although the KMT’s alliance on equal terms with local factions and moneyed interests
enabled it to stay in power, the party had to pay a steep price for its coalitions. The
quality  of  the  political  process  worsened,  and  the  general  public’s  increasing
dissatisfaction  with  money  politics  and  organised  crime  influence  on  politics  was
accompanied with feelings of political inefficacy25. Much blame for this was laid on the
KMT26. 
21 Put differently, the costs for regime maintenance the KMT had to bear in the currency
of legitimacy rose sharply. This probably had been foreseen in the party headquarters.
Since  the  late  1960s,  there  had  been  efforts  to  prevent  the  KMT  from  too  much
dependence on societal forces that might later prove hard to hold in check. The failure
of these policies can be explained neatly in institutionalist terms.
22 Reformers  in  the  KMT soon found out  that  the  costs  of  changing  the  rules  of  the
political game were likely to surpass the costs of regime maintenance, which had the
consequence that the KMT shifted from cause- to symptom-oriented policies in its fight
against “black gold”. More concretely, the Party mainstream might have realised that a
full-fledged  democratisation  of  the  political  system  might  result  in  either  the
subversion of the process by the still powerful conservative forces, or in bringing the
DPP to power. At any rate, a far-reaching political system change was difficult given the
harm  that  sweeping  constitutional  reforms,  not  to  mention  the  passage  of  a  new
Constitution, might have done to the relations with mainland China. 
23 The KMT chose regime maintenance. This, however, meant facing a dilemma: needing
to limit the drain of legitimacy that resulted from its alliance with local factions and
moneyed interests,  while at  the same time continuing to rely on this  alliance.  In a
process of gradual learning, the KMT’s policies thus shifted from attempts to free itself
from local factions and moneyed interests to a mix of accommodation and selective
persecution. However, the further the democratic transition progressed, the stronger
the  latter  became  as  they  could  now  expand  and  form  alliances.  Conversely,  the
organisational  capacity  of  the  KMT was  severely  weakened after  the  passing  of  its
supreme leader Chiang Ching-kuo. The party was eventually torn apart by national-
level  factions  fighting  for  predominance  and  local  factions  fighting  for  autonomy.
Ultimately, no party faction could stay in power without the help of the groups the
party initially sought to fight. The KMT was thus losing the fight against “black gold”. 
24 As early as 1968,  the KMT started to phase out its  relationship to local  factions by
gradually nominating party cadres instead of factional candidates for local elections.
According to Chen Ming-tong, this strategy was quite successful until it backfired in
1977: “That year, the KMT lost four mayoral seats, 21 provincial assembly seats, and
suffered the ‘Chung Li incident’. This was an unprecedented setback for the KMT, which
started the democratisation process in Taiwan”27. As Chen Ming-tong has shown, this
setback prompted the party to re-increase its reliance on local factions to deliver the
vote, albeit with a different mechanism: from the early 1980s on, primary elections
were held before local elections, forcing would-be candidates of local factions to seek
KMT membership and compete with non-factional candidates for nomination. Again,
the KMT overplayed its hand when it steeply increased the number of non-factional
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candidates  for  the 1989 primary elections:  in  the mayoral,  provincial  assembly and
Legislative  Yuan  elections  that  year  it  faced  “unprecedented  setbacks”28.  These
setbacks marked the end of the KMT’s efforts to reign in the local factions. The split
that ensued in the party after Chiang Ching-kuo’s death pitted Lee Teng-hui and his
followers in the KMT (the so-called “mainstream faction”) against various hard-line
factions.  This  struggle  strengthened  the  hand  of  local  factions  and  Taiwanese
entrepreneurs when they became Lee’s partners in his quest for political dominance,
providing them access to the apex of  power.  The “mainstream faction” became “in
many  respects,  a  collection  of  local  factions”29.  This  did  not  change  during  Lee’s
presidency.
25 As  the  KMT  could  not  reduce  what  after  democratisation  had  become  an  outright
dependence on local factions, it aimed at shoring up its legitimacy among the general
public without having to break with them. A measure that would allow it to combat not
the factions themselves but the most delegitimating practice associated with them was
to crack down on vote-buying. During the 1994 elections for county commissioner, the
KMT government launched the biggest crackdown on vote-buying in its history. 257
were  convicted,  including  about  30%  of  all  county  legislators  and  nearly  every
commissioner30. This greatly alienated the local factions, and Chen Ming-tong indicates
that  there is  a  direct  relationship between this  crackdown and the KMT’s  electoral
disaster  in  the  subsequent  legislative  elections.  He  also  intimates  that  provincial
governor and Lee’s rival James Soong used this alienation to shore up his own power
base by strengthening his relationship to township- and village-based local factions.
Using a loophole in the budgetary law, Soong toured the island for his re-election bid
for provincial governor and showered more than 300 towns and villages with promises
of local construction projects worth about NT$80 billion31. Soong won the election with
56.22% of the votes. These experiences and the fact that it was virtually impossible to
bring the indicted to justice32 might very well  have decided the Lee government to
refrain from further crackdowns. 
26 Another  measure  the  KMT  took was  crackdowns  on  organised  crime.  Again,  party
central found itself in a Catch-22 situation: some local-level KMT candidates (most of
them from local factions) depended on organised crime elements during their electoral
campaigns and often even after they took office. On the other hand, the general public
grew increasingly concerned with the worsening public security situation caused by
organised crime. As Tien Hung-mao put it:  “The KMT is now in a no-win situation.
Failure to prosecute the guilty parties would further the KMT’s image as a corrupt
political machine. Successful prosecution, however, which may involve most city and
county councils, could severely shake the KMT’s local foundations. Without the support
of local factions and their controversial  vote-catching practices,  the party in power
may face a stunning reduction in its reliable voter base”33.
27 According to Chin Ko-lin, this dilemma forced the KMT administration to adopt the
double-pronged strategy  of  selective  persecution.  These  half-heartened  attempts  to
combat organised crime did not solve the mafia problem, rather it worsened it.
28 The first  major crackdown on organised crime was “Operation Cleansweep”.  In the
course of this operation, more than four thousand alleged underworld figures were
arrested and many of them were sent to reform camps, only to be released four years
later34. As both Chao Yung-mao and Chin Ko-lin have pointed out, this crackdown had
adverse  consequences.  Some  gang  leaders  formed  alliances  when  they  served  time
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together, thus broadening the scope of individual crime groups. Further, after leaving
prison,  they  had  to  wrest  power  back  from  their  successors  who  had  taken over
following their arrest. This led to gang wars and the decline of the code of conduct that
existed  between  these  groups,  increasing  the  violence  within  organised  crime35.  In
addition, in order to protect themselves, organised crime figures no longer relied solely
on the protection of politicians, but sought political office themselves36. The success of
this and other, more small-scale sweeps is questionable, as one agent of the Ministry of
Justice’s Investigation Bureau acknowledges: “The crackdown of Yi-ching [Cleansweep]
was a failure. We had to have more operations thereafter to round criminals up. If it
was a success, why was it necessary to create more massive, anticrime operations? The
more sweeps, the more heidao [mafia] figures. There has to be a rethink of our policy”37.
Accordingly,  when  Liao  Cheng-hao,  the  major  hand  behind  the  post-Operation
Cleansweep crackdowns suddenly resigned in 1998,  the efforts  to  rein in  organised
crime subsided38.
29 The description of the KMT’s anti-“black gold“ policies would be incomplete without
mentioning the passage of several important laws. In 1993,  the “Public Functionary
Assets Disclosure Law” (gongzhi renyuan caichan shenbaofa) was passed against the will of
the KMT party centre, and was seen as a major step towards public accountability of
government  officials.  The  Disclosure  Law  stipulates  that  public  functionaries  must
report  their  financial  assets  to  the  Control  Yuan  annually39,  which  publishes  these
data40. 
30 However, the law has proved to be without teeth for three major reasons. First, the
sanctions for transgression are a mere slap on the wrist. Refusal to be investigated is
punished by NT$20,000 to NT$100,00041, and misreporting results in a fine of NT$60,000
to NT$300,00042. Next, since the Control Yuan lacks the resources to randomly review
even one tenth of the reports filed, cheating on the reports involves little risk. Thus no
disciplinary action is taken even in high profile cases involving billions of dollars and
political heavyweights. They are merely given a fine. And seldom did the Control Yuan
follow cases up to check for misreporting serving to cover up the breach of another
law. Hence a further lack of efficiency and effectiveness of this particular law43. 
31 The  Organised  Crime  Prevention  Law  was  passed  in  1996  to  supplement  the
controversial Anti-Hoodlum Law, which was implemented in 1955, revised in 1981 and
in parts  declared unconstitutional  in  199544.  The law carries  drastic  fines  for  being
involved in an organised crime group, and based on this law, 675 people were arrested
in Operation Chih-ping,  which followed Operation Cleansweep from August  1996 to
June 1998. Of these 675, 162—of which 35 were local-level representatives—were sent to
the  Green  Island  correction  facilities45.  Despite  this  achievement  however,  sloppy
implementation meant its impact on mafia involvement in politics was negligible. Of
these 35 representatives, eight were from the district/ city level. According to former
Minister of Justice Liao Cheng-hao, the number of representatives at this level involved
in organised crime stood at 260, about one-third of the total46. 
32 In  January  2000,  the  Legislative  Yuan  passed  the  Witness  Protection  Law (zhengren
baohufa),  which had been drafted and introduced into the legislative process several
times  by  the  Ministry  of  Justice  between  1996  and  1998.  As  the  KMT  lost  the
presidential elections only two months later, the law did not see implementation under
this administration, but served as a basis for the new administration’s anti-“black gold“
policies.
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The DPP programme to combat “black gold”
33 The  DPP  was  the  opposition  that  the  aforementioned  “umbrella  structure  of
authoritarianism” sought to keep out of politics. Thus, making Taiwan’s politics fairer
and more democratic had been on its campaign agenda since its foundation in 1986.
Money  politics  and  reliance  on  local  factions  did  not  only  reduce  the  polity’s
democratic  quality,  but gave the DPP a major political  disadvantage because it  had
neither the organisational power nor the financial means to sustain such a network. I
argue that for this reason it strove to change the rules of the political game by means of
an ambitious programme. While the DPP did not lack the determination to realise this
programme, its efforts were seriously hampered both by residues of authoritarianism
in  the  bureaucracy  inherited  from  the  KMT  era  and its  minority  of  seats  in  the
Legislative  Yuan.  The  latter  was  especially  challenging,  because  institutional
restructuring can hardly be achieved without making adjustments in the legal system.
34 In  July  2000,  two  months  after  taking  office,  the  DPP  administration  started  to
implement  its  “Programme  for  Sweeping  away  Organised  Crime  and  Corruption”
(saochu heijin xingdong fangan). Its sphere of action was to be three major fields: the fight
against  organised  crime  (saohei), counter-corruption  measures  ( yantan) and
investigations into election-related bribery (chabai). The programme combined efforts
to enact new laws, revise existing ones, build anti-corruption organisations and was
flanked by personnel reshuffles and the restructuring of government organisations47. 
35 The last point, no doubt the precondition on which the successful implementation of
the whole programme rested, proved the hardest to realise. In his efforts to establish a
highly centralised “anti-corruption administration”, the new Minister of Justice, Chen
Ding-nan  announced that  he  would  merge  the  anti-corruption  department  of  the
Ministry’s Investigation Bureau (MJIB) with the Government Ethics Department into an
“anti-corruption task force”48. The MJIB, during the authoritarian era the backbone of
the  regime’s  internal  security  apparatus,  still  wielded  enough  political  clout  to
successfully resist this plan, testifying to the ongoing entrenchment of authoritarian
institutions in Taiwan’s young democracy. The standoff between Chen Ding-nan and
the  MJIB  only  ended one  year  later  when the  Executive  Yuan suddenly  decided to
replace the MJIB director49.  Although this improved co-operation, legislation on the
envisioned “anti-corruption agency” with powers of search, seizure and arrest did not
pass the Legislative Yuan.
36 The  institutional  overlap  that  complicates  the  fight  against  “black  gold”  is  thus
considerable. Responsibilities now fall on the MJIB, the Ministry of Justice Government
Ethics  Department  and  the  Judicial  Yuan,  under  whose  auspices  a  “Black  Gold
Investigation  Centre”  (BGIC)  was  established.  The  BGIC,  located  in  the  High  Court
Prosecutor’s office, supervises four “special investigation sections” in Taipei, Taichung,
Tainan and Kaohsiung. Combining prosecutors and investigators, and being authorised
to  issue  orders  to  local  district  prosecutors,  agents  from  the  MJIB,  military  police
officers and police officers, they are the cornerstone of anti-“black gold” investigation
work. 
37 Organisation-building  was  merely  one  pillar  of  the  anti-“black  gold”  programme.
Institution-building was another. That Taiwan had been an authoritarian state where
party  directives  and  informal  arrangements  were  more  important  than  legal
stipulations meant that there was only a weak legal basis on which to build democratic
institutions. This resulted in the problem that although Taiwan had formally become a
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democracy, the underlying legal framework did not address practices incommensurate
with  democratic  principles.  Therefore,  large-scale  “loans”  and  “donations”  to
legislators, influence-peddling and abusing insider-information was clearly considered
undemocratic, but they were not illegal50. Building democratic institutions was further
complicated by the problem that the Legislative Yuan was still dominated by interests
representing  the  “old  order”.  Majorities  for  institutional  reforms  countering  these
interests were thus hard to come by. Nevertheless, the MOJ laid out an ambitious plan
for legal reform. 
38 Two prongs of this effort can be identified: first, the revision of existing laws such as
the Public Functionaries Election and Recall Law, the Civil Servant Services Act, the
Public Functionary Assets Disclosure Law, the Money Laundering Control Act and the
Anti-Corruption Penal Statute (see Table 1).
39 The second prong is the drafting of new and important laws, such as the Political Party
Law, the Statute Regarding the Disposition of Assets Improperly Obtained by Political
Parties,  the Lobby Law,  the Political  Contributions Law and the Conflict  of  Interest
Prevention Law (Table 2).
 
2. Legal Revision proposed as part of the Ministry of Justice’s “Action Programme to Sweep Out
Black Gold"
Sources: Ibid table 1
40 The  third  pillar  in  the  fight  against  “black  gold”  were  the  actual  investigations
conducted by the Black Gold Investigation Centre and other agencies, cracking down on
vote-buying,  bribery  (especially  in  public  construction  projects),  judicial  fraud  and
organised crime. It was this “third pillar” that became especially prominent in the fight
against  “black  gold”  and  was  widely  held  responsible  for  producing  the  cleanest
elections ever held in Taiwan. The Legislative Yuan elections in December 2001 were
accompanied  by  massive  campaigns  aimed  to  dissuade  the  Taiwanese  populace  to
accept money for their votes and by even more massive crackdowns on vote captains
and the legislators who had hired them. The MOJ saw the number of people indicted to
be  the  main  indicator  of  their  success.  For  example,  the  number  of  public
representatives on all levels indicted for corruption and vote-buying rose from 152 in
March 2001 to 317 in August 2001 and to 1,272 in March 2004. The total number of
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people indicted was 11,097 at that time (out of 27,986 prosecuted). Of those put on trial,
1,641 were found “guilty”, and 1,534 “not guilty”51. It should be emphasised that those
convicted were by no means all connected to KMT, PFP or independent legislators or
bureaucratic  personnel  leaning  towards  these  parties.  In  line  with  the  above
observation that the “black gold” problem also began to affect the DPP, some of the
ruling party’s city- and county-level legislators were also among the convicted. The
DPP centre’s actions were by no means one-sided and, considering the close scrutiny by
the public and the opposition, probably could not have been. 
Impact of the anti-“black gold” programme
41 Despite the fact that the frequent “sweeps” against vote-buying and organised crime
were probably successful in bringing many of Taiwan’s most notorious gangsters to
justice and serve as a deterrent against vote-buying, these figures raise the question if
these successes were traded against the protection of human rights. Indeed, individual
cases  show  that  prosecutors  were  over-zealous  in  their  fight  against  “black  gold”,
tapping  phones  without  judicial  supervision  and  conducting  searches  without
warrants52.  Also,  the  administration’s  draft  amendment  to  the  Public  Functionaries
Election and Recall Law, which would bar organised crime suspects from running in
elections, sparked considerable controversy. One reason is that a suspect would become
a  “political  convict,”  another  is  that  this  clause  only  applies  to  suspects  of  an
“organised” criminal background. This raises definitional problems and discriminates
against the former group.
42 Another indicator that could be used for determining the success of Chen Shui-bian’s
crusade against corruption and vote-buying is the financial situation of the grassroots
financial  organisations  which were  identified  as  a  major  resource  for  corrupt  local
politicians. In July 2001, Chen Shui-bian vowed to close down, merge or have taken over
by public  banks the 35 most  defunct  of  these organisations,  among them 27 credit
departments of farmers’ associations. In addition, the government earmarked NT$140
billion as a “cleanup fund” to rid these organisations of their bad loans (which actually
exceeded NT$210 billion)53.  Again, the results were mixed. The overall percentage of
these  organisation’s  overdue loans  decreased significantly  from an all-time high of
18.19% in June 2002 to 13.39% in January 2004. Most successful was the bailing out of
the 48 local credit co-operatives, the overdue loans of which were halved from 13.08%
to 6.94% during this period. However, not much ground was gained in the case of the
credit  departments  of  the  314  farmers’  and  fishermen’s  associations,  the  most
important  “money machines” for  local  politicians.  Their  overdue loans decreased a
mere  3.73%,  from  21.44%  in  June  2002  to  17.71%  in  January  2004.  As  for  closures,
mergers  or  takeovers,  13  credit  co-operatives,  34  credit  departments  of  farmers’
associations and two credit departments of fishermen’s associations were thus disposed
of54.
43 Again, success was mixed. This can hardly be blamed on the DPP administration, as all
the  drafts  outlined  above  were  introduced  and  frequently  reintroduced  for
consideration in the Legislative Yuan. Most of them, however, were voted down by an
alliance of KMT, PFP and independent legislators, who would face severe losses if the
new regulations had been passed. Despite this, the Public Officials Conflict of Interest
Prevention Law was passed on July 1st 2000, and the Political Contributions Law on
March  18th  2004,  only  two  days  before  the  presidential  election.  Scandals,  public
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pressure and the KMT’s struggle to portray itself as a clean party probably were major
factors facilitating the passage of the Political Contributions Law. 
44 Although the passage of these laws can be regarded as milestones in Taiwan’s process
of democratic consolidation, Taiwan still has a long way to go. Notably, the Political
Party Law and the Lobby Law still  await  passage.  But passage alone is  not enough.
Another problem has been the enforcement of these laws. Some laws only carry minor
fines (such as the Assets Disclosure Law), some overlap (such as the five laws regulating
the legislative process with the Conflict of Interest Prevention Law and, if passed, the
Lobby Law),  and some are not  strictly  enforced (as  is  the case with the Conflict  of
Interest Law, the Assets Disclosure Law and the Money Laundering Law). Reasons for
these shortcomings are organisational overlaps, understaffing of the relevant agencies
and small budget allocations55. These problems can again be partly blamed on blockade
politics in the legislature. Another part of the explanation rests on the fact that the
new administration was not  readily  accepted by the subordinate bureaucratic  staff,
which  could  block  important  policies.  Of  course,  the  inexperience  of  the  first-time
administration was another factor leading to policy blunders56. 
45 However, as Shangmao Chen and Chengtian Kuo show, the influence of “black gold” on
Taiwan’s polity was significantly reduced simply because the new administration could
not  take  the  KMT’s  former  position  as  a  hub  in  the  informal  network.  The  large
conglomerates’ influence on politics was weakened as economic liberalisation subjected
them  to  competition.  One  direct  result  was  that  many  of  these  conglomerates,
including those owned by the KMT, started to incur severe losses. Furthermore, the
new administration replaced key personnel in state-owned enterprises and banks as
well as in the bureaucracy, further weakening the old structures57. Thus, the simple fact
that the opposition had been able to wrest political power away from the KMT and that
it was willing to play by the rules it had created has been a major factor helping to
further clean politics. 
46 Taiwan’s authoritarian past has made the deepening of Taiwan’s democracy extremely
difficult. I have shown that informal arrangements incommensurate with democratic
principles have not only persisted after democratisation, but have gone out of control.
Although corruption and organised crime had existed before the 1990s, they became
rampant when the KMT’s “mainstream faction” utilised alliances with local factions,
influential businesspeople and even organised criminals to defend themselves not only
against the opposition without, but also that within their own party. This created a
political  environment  where  influence  had  to  be  bought  and  which  undermined
political accountability as well as economic efficiency. 
47 The important continuity between the two administrations is that both aimed to fight
the  adverse  consequences  of  these  institutional  arrangements.  One  symbolic
illustration  of  this  is  that  the  Chen  administration  used  the  same  name  for  its
anti-“black  gold“  programme  as  the  Lee  administration  had  used  for  its  rather
unsystematic approach a few years ago. Despite the differences in content, the title
“Programme for Sweeping away Organised Crime and Corruption“ is not an invention
of  the  DPP58.  A  summary  evaluation  of  this  programme  published  in  1998,  the
“Sweeping Away Organised Crime and Corruption White Book” (saohei baipishu),  was
presented to presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian by former Minister of Justice Liao
Cheng-hao in 199959. There have always been individuals and groups in the KMT who
were sincere about fighting corruption60.  Conversely,  under the DPP administration,
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some of  its  local-level  functionaries  and representatives became involved in money
politics as well. This shows that the difference between these two parties’ anti-“black
gold” policies probably stems not from differences in morality or their elites’ political
culture, but from the institutional setting that determines their spheres of action. The
KMT  had  abandoned  its  reform  efforts  when  it  saw  that  the  transaction  costs  an
institutional overhaul incurred were very likely to supersede the costs of maintaining
the current system, at least in the medium-term. Yet the DPP could not have taken over
this  system even if  it  had wanted to,  so  institutional  change was the only sensible
strategy to pursue.
48 Therefore,  the major  difference between the two administrations’  anti-“black gold”
policies was that the DPP had nothing to lose, but much to win from revamping the
administrative,  legal  and financial  apparatus and indiscriminately persecuting vote-
buyers, organised criminals and corrupt politicians alike. Indeed, failure to do so might
have  catapulted  it  back  into  opposition.  Even  so,  institutional  and  organisational
change  proved  difficult  to  achieve.  Accordingly,  the  DPP  too  had  to  rely  more  on
symptom-oriented  than on  cause-oriented  policies  to  prove  its  resolve,  but  here  it
achieved more than the KMT ever had. Important “big brothers” were arrested, others
have fled the country, and vote-buying has decreased significantly. The bureaucracy
has become more assertive towards the Legislative Yuan, and the KMT’s big business
cronies’ political influence has been weakened. 
49 These  achievements,  however,  are  not  irreversible  as  long as  the  formal  rules  and
regulations  that  structure  Taiwan’s  politics  remain  incomplete,  contradictory  and
partly dysfunctional. The DPP has not managed to make much headway here, partly
because of  its  inexperience in administrative matters,  but mostly because its  hands
were bound by a pan-blue dominated legislature. The recent presidential election has
given the DPP the mandate to continue its reform policies, but the legislative election
in December will decide if it is given the chance to really make a difference. 
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ABSTRACTS
This article analyses the policies of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) administration’s policies to fight corruption, organised crime and vote-buying from two
different perspectives. The first looks at policy, examining formulation, implementation and the
impact  of  the  most  relevant  measures  taken.  The  other  is  an  institutionalist  perspective,
explaining  how  constraints  have  limited  the  relevant  actors’  scope  of  action,  resulting  in
outcomes often not matching those intended.
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